Welcome to Year Four! This month represents the beginning of my fourth year writing for FundAlarm. Such occasions bring to mind The Grateful Dead – my students think of them as contemporaries of Bach, Beethoven and the Beatles – who famously end Truckin’ with “Lately it occurs to me: What a long, strange trip it's been.” Roy launched the FundAlarm Annex with this question:
| Why on earth would any reasonable person want to look at new mutual funds? After all, they’re generally expensive, untested and unnecessary. Do you really think the world needs to be alerted of another fund whose strategy is pretty much limited to declaring “we’re contrarian all-cap investors who look for ‘blood in the streets’”? Much less somebody who thinks that your financial life won’t be complete until you’re able to allocate 10% of your portfolio to doubling the inverse of the Botswanan bourse?
We (I) think there are at least two good reasons for such a service (three, if you count “keeping Snowball off the streets at night”). First, you need to know there are alternatives to the generation of beached whales that dominate many personal portfolios. . . Second, you need the opportunity to think about what you’ve been doing. Even if you’re not dissatisfied with the choices you’ve made, you’ll find that looking at new opportunities and the (occasionally) new ways of thinking that they represent will help you keep a better perspective on the choices you’ve already made. |
Leuthold Core reopens to existing shareholders
The March New-Fund page was supposed to lead with a story on the surprise reopening of Leuthold Core (LCORX), a very successful and eclectic fund that had been closed tight for three years. Unfortunately, a static spark scrambled the March file at the last minute (really!). In reconstructing the file, I forgot to re-enter the Leuthold story, but I caught the omission and posted the update on FundAlarm’s discussion board a couple of days later. For those of you who missed it, the Leuthold story now can be found where it should have been all along: at the top of my March, 2009 New-Fund Page, now located in the archives (look for the heading "This just in: Leuthold Core reopens to current shareholders")
The fund reopened to allow the managers to exploit a number of compelling new opportunities. It opened only to existing shareholders to give the managers the opportunity to better manage potential inflows. The fund rose 5.8% in its first month after reopening (through 3/29), modestly trailing its balanced fund peer group.
Return of The Ron (Insana, that is)
Three years ago, Ron Insana left CNBC for the rich life of the hedge fund investor. Today, he’s back working part-time for his old employer. Why so? Two factors: (1) he lost his investors’ money and (2) his plans for making more money turned out to be "eminently feasible" only in a better market. Note to Ron: all of our plans for getting rich are "eminently feasible" in a good – or, at least, normal – market.
Mr. Insana’s difficulties don’t come as much of a surprise, since the whole "financial journalist to financial genius" route is a bit tricky. Jim Cramer pulled it off. He worked for five years as a print journalist before attending Harvard Law. He moved into the investment business when, after law school, Rudy Giuliani turned him down for a prosecutor’s job because Cramer’s grades hadn’t been high enough. Cramer reports annualized returns of 24% at his hedge fund, though a more-profitable strategy of late has been shorting his stock recommendations (see "Shorting Cramer," Barrons, 8/20/07). Lou Dobbs did not. After a fight with CNN executives, Dobbs left the network in 1999 to serve as president of space.com. He returned a couple years later to the business of spittle-spraying populism. He took a break from populism just long enough to vigorously defend accounting giant Arthur Andersen against the federal indictment that destroyed the firm, but did so without mentioning Andersen’s business relationship with space.com (see "Moneyline Anchor Discloses His Business Links to Andersen," New York Times, 4/2/02).
The record for other ink jockeys is less clear. John Rekenthaler, English major extraordinaire and then-publisher of Morningstar Mutual Funds, spent a couple years in the late 90s with The John Nuveen Company before returning to his role as The Wizard on Wacker. Jonathan Clements spent 14 years writing The Wall Street Journal’s "Getting Going" column (1994-2008) before joining Citigroup as Director of Financial Guidance for myFi, a new financial service "for everyday Americans." Clements describes his task as "building a wonderful, customer-friendly business that minimizes conflicts of interest, favors index funds, and helps everyday Americans with their entire financial lives." He denounced the proposed 90% bonus tax in a funny, bitter article ("The Bonus Tax Is Just Plain Stupid," Wall Street Journal, 3/23/09) that points out that he’d be a target of the bonus tax once his income reaches $250,000. He calculates that will occur in mid-October 2009 and his family’s best interest would be served if he simply took a sabbatical for the remainder of the year and "hunkered down at home, desperately trying not to spend money." He could then cash his year-end bonus without fear of confiscation.
The newest emigrant might be Dylan Ratigan, former host of CNBC’s "Fast Money" program, who "abruptly" left the network on Friday after failed contract negotiations. Rumor has it that Ratigan would love a late night talk show a la Letterman but, being a joker, he might be a more-natural fit in hedge funds. ("Dylan Ratigan of CNBC’s ‘Fast Money’ Leaves Network," New York Times, 3/27/09).
They are: The Funds That Wouldn’t Die
The Van Wagoner funds have been stalking the landscape like some undead creature, despite the best efforts of their new board of directors to drive a stake through their hearts. They now threaten to replace the Steadman Funds – long derided as "the Deadman Funds" for their atrocious performance and deceased but not departed shareholders – as the fund world’s Icon of Ineptitude.
As all true sports fans know, the Van Wagoner funds were briefly brilliant. Their triple-digit returns in the late 1990s brought investors in droves. Which gave these new fans front row seats to The Great Implosion: three consecutive years of breathtaking losses. Springing into action, the former board of directors decided to liquidate several of the funds. Which they somehow couldn’t quite accomplish: the "liquidated" funds moved their remaining assets to cash in 2003. You could be forgiven for the mistaken belief that funds invested purely in cash couldn’t lose money. The money market fund formerly known as Van Wagoner Technology lost money in five of the next six years – including a 10% drop in 2005 – while the former Van Wagoner Post Venture lost money in four of the six years. The funds legally had no investment advisor which, at the very least, should have held costs down (but didn’t).
Enter a new board with a reform agenda: change the mandates to create some distinction between the funds, bring in competent management, lower expenses and reopen the closed funds to new investors. Post-Venture Fund would be renamed Large-Cap Growth Fund (EMLGX) and the Technology Fund would be renamed Focused Opportunities Fund (EMFOX), both managed by Husic Capital Management.
This might have worked, except for the refusal of shareholders to approve the change. Why would any rational set of people want to guarantee themselves losses on high expense money market funds, with no possibility of ever seeing a gain? The advisers aren’t talking, but the likely problem lies with Aunt Betty. Uncle Larry was the money guy in the family, made all sorts of investments but he’s gone now. Leaving Aunt Betty, who keeps getting these odd and complicated letters in the mail and who keeps putting them (unopened) in a box in the front closet. Since the board needs the approval of 51% of all shareholders – not just 51% of those who chose to vote – Aunt Betty and hundreds of folks like her can exercise a veto over fund liquidation or restructuring. And did.
This left the adviser with the need for a new plan, which they filed March 10 with the SEC. Instead of Husic, the adviser will select several subadvisors. And instead of becoming the Large Cap Growth fund, it will be the Absolute Return Strategy fund while the proposed Focused Opportunities fund will give way to Market Neutral Strategy.
A great plan, assuming Aunt Betty agrees.
On the other hand, there is a booming "deathwatch" business
After the closing of 359 mutual funds in 2008, observers are predicting another 500 disappearances this year. As of March 5, 35 funds had already announced their closure this year (compared to 19 and 16 in the same period for 2008 and 2007). ("Mutual fund death toll so far this year: 35," Investment News, 3/10/09). Another handful of funds have joined the death roll since then:
Effective March 27, Bjurman, Barry Micro-Cap Growth Fund (BMCFX) disappeared in the GAMCO Westwood Mighty Mites Fund (WMMAX). The Bjurman fund had a great run around the turn of the century and assets approached $900 million, almost ten times their present level and a huge amount to invest in a tiny space. They got nailed in 2005 for misappropriating the money raised by 12(b)1 fee, just as performance tumbled. In recent years, the board liquidated two other Bjurman funds, leaving only microcap in operation. Shareholders now face the higher expenses imposed by the Gabelli operation, but Gabelli has done a fine job of managing WMMAX to consistently top-tier returns.
Effective April 30, Royce Technology Value Fund (RYTVX) will cease to exist "primarily because over the last several years it has not attracted and maintained assets at a sufficient level for it to be viable."
Effective June 5, DWS Core Plus Allocation Fund (CORAX), DWS Disciplined Long/Short Value Fund (LSVLX) and DWS Micro Cap Fund (SMFAX) – with less than $50 million between them – are gone.
Dean International fund (DAIVX) is being liquidated by its Board of Trustees "due to the resignation of the Fund’s sub-adviser and the adviser’s inability to find a new sub-adviser with international experience that is willing to manage the Fund at a comparable rate of compensation due to the Fund’s small size." The $8 million fund is 12 years old and has a record of solidly above-average returns.
NS Small Cap Growth fund (NSIPX) is being liquidated by its Board of Trustees because it is "no longer economically viable to continue managing the Fund as a result of the Fund’s small asset size and increasing regulatory and operating costs borne by the adviser." The $2 million fund had a distinctly mixed track record.
Ron Rowland now lists 171 funds (134 ETFs and 37 ETNs) on his official "ETF Deathwatch" site. Rowland tracks ETFs which are at least six months old and trade under $100,000 shares/day. One ETF, SPDR S&P International Consumer Discretionary (IPD), sees under $200 in trades on the average day. Rowland’s tally is suspiciously coincident with the calculation done by SmartMoney: "The morning after the market’s recent 500-point swing, we counted 175 ETFs on our ETF Tracker that had failed to trade a single share by 11 a.m." ("ETF Death Watch: Why Are Funds Closing?" 3/24/09).
The only reason not to maintain a hedge fund deathwatch appears to be that disappearing hedge funds are so common that they’re scarcely worth noticing. Tom Sullivan reports in Barron’s that "[a] record 1,471 were liquidated in 2008 . . . an increase of 70% from the previous full-year record of 848 liquidations, set in 2005" ("Hedgies' New Clone-War Battle," 3/28/09).
There is a way in which all of this mortality might be bullish. When a fund – mutual, exchange-traded or hedge – liquidates, it transfers its assets into a liquid form. That is, it goes to cash and that cash must, eventually, be redeployed. The Investment Company Institute’s Money Market Working Group just placed, as their highest recommendation, that "money market funds should be better positioned to sustain prolonged and extreme redemption pressures" (3/17/09). Greed – fear of missing out on market gains – would be one driver of mass redemptions from the $3.9 trillion dollar money market sector. Fear, of course, would be the other.
This brings us to . . .
The real difference between hedge funds and mutual funds
The first rule for hedge fund managers: when in doubt, run away! Or, as Benjamin Alpert of Morningstar put it, they "did what hedge funds do best -- they quit. Folded shop, returned what assets remained, expired. They became ex-hedge funds. Either that, or they crawled into a cave to lick their wounds…" ("Hedge Funds: Where Did That One-Star Fund Go? 3/23/09). That commentary was in response to the finding that 615 one-star hedge funds vanished in 2008, 36% of all funds with that rating.
The first rule for mutual fund managers: when in doubt, hire yer kid. As of February 20, Will Nasgovitz became co-manager of the Heartland Value fund with dad Bill Nasgovitz. Actually, Roy pointed out back in August 2005 that the rule (even in these supposedly enlightened times) appears to be closer to "hire your son to run money and your daughter to run the Xerox" (
http://www.fundalarm.com/arc0605.htm). The Nasgovitzi follow such luminary duos as David and Maurice Schoenwald (New Alternatives), Ab and David Nicholas (Nicholas funds), Don and Craig Hodges (Hodges Fund) and John W. and John C. Thompson (Thompson funds).Well, not the Thompson funds so much. John the Younger has asked for, and was granted, an indefinite leave of absence by Thompson’s board. According to a filing with the SEC, John C. "announced that, effective immediately, he was taking a temporary leave." Since he was co-manager of two funds, president and chief operating officer of the adviser, his departure set off quite a scramble. One gets the sense of a power struggle inside the firm: John C. reportedly "chafed" at new board-imposed restrictions on his investment style while the board presumably chafed at the fund’s tendency to trail 95-98% of its peers in recent years.
What part of "illiquid" didn’t you understand?
Firsthand Technology Value Fund
(TVFQX) sent a quick wake-up call to shareholders when it recently disclosed the extent of its illiquid holdings. Let’s recall the two salient features of illiquid investments: (1) you probably can’t sell them and (2) you don’t know what they’re worth until you try to sell them. Up until then, managers invoke arcane arts to determine what value to claim for these little gems. Understandably, the SEC is nervous about the prospect that a fund might load up – a la AIG – on such investments so they forbid funds from purchasing additional illiquid securities once such securities constitute 15% or more of a fund’s portfolio. This would lead you to think that funds wouldn’t ever have much more than 15% of their portfolio in such investments. The good folks at the Tech Value fund disabused their shareholders of the notion with their recent announcement that illiquid investments constitute 40% of the fund’s portfolio. As of December 31, 2008, 30% of the fund was wrapped up in just two privately-held solar power companies, SoloPower and Silicon Genesis. Faced with shareholder redemptions, Tech Value had to sell portions of its holdings but since illiquid securities are, well, illiquid, they were forced to sell only the liquid securities. And with each sale of a liquid security, the percentage of the fund in illiquid assets rose.Fido rolls out new share classes, and a fund managed by famous guys
Fidelity has filed to create two new share classes for many of its funds: "K" shares which "generally are available only to employer-sponsored retirement plans for which an affiliate of FMR provides recordkeeping services" and "F" shares which are available only to other Fidelity funds. While most of the "F" funds are simply different wrappers for existing retail funds, some of them are not. Fidelity Series All-Sector Equity is a multi-manager fund run by the managers of nine other Fidelity funds (including Robert Stansky, who oversaw Magellan’s decline from a $112 billion fund to a $52 billion fund). Mr. Stansky "retired" in 2005. It’s not clear what he’s been doing in the intervening years. It appears that Mr. Stansky will sort of manage the team: each manager, other than Stansky, is responsible for stock-picking within a particular industry. Steven Kaye, Growth & Income’s retired manager, is responsible for health care stocks. And Adam Hetnarski, formerly of Export & Multinational and Growth Discovery will . . . .hey, hey, hey! I think I’ve solved "The Case of the Disappearing Disappointing Managers"!
Oh, and each industry’s weight in the portfolio will generally match its weight in the S&P500 which makes Mr. Stansky’s responsibilities with the fund a bit unclear.
Working for PIMCO must be fascinating
In February, Bill Gross announced the death of equity investing. In March, two of the three PIMCO funds with the option of changing their equity exposure – All Asset and All Asset All Authority – increased equities in the portfolio while trimming Mr. Gross’s favorite asset classes. The third fund doesn’t yet have an updated portfolio report.
In December 2007, Bill Gross denounced hedge funds as "an unregulated bank. A bank isn’t a con but a bank is a regulated entity. A hedge fund is not…it’s been a con on the government in terms of their unwillingness to regulate the industry" ("Gross: Economy in Recession, Hedge Funds a ‘Con’," FT.com, 12/20/07). In December 2008, Bill Gross launched a hedge fund to help dodge adverse IRS rulings:
Effective on or about December 22, 2008, the PIMCO Cayman Commodity Fund II Ltd., will commence operations as a wholly-owned subsidiary of the PIMCO Global Multi-Asset Fund . . . The Subsidiary is not registered under the 1940 Act, and is not subject to all the investor protections of the 1940 Act. In addition, changes in the laws of the United States and/or the Cayman Islands could result in the inability of the Fund and/or the Subsidiary to operate as described in this prospectus ….
Hey, isn’t that … uhh, unregulated? You know, some kind of "con"?
Briefly noted:
Rob Rodriquez of FPA Capital announced (3/12/09) his impending year-long sabbatical, which is slated to start in January, 2010. He hopes to focus on "my family and friendships outside of work" and return refreshed in 2011.
Effective March 17, 2009, the Gabelli SRI Fund, a decent mid-cap blend fund with just $2 million in assets, became Gabelli SRI Green Fund. The fund will invest "no less than 80% of its assets in common stocks and preferred stocks of companies that meet the Fund's guidelines for both social responsibility and sustainability at the time of investment
Effective March 13, 2009, Perkins Small Cap Value Fund -- Investor Shares (JSCVX) reopened to new individual investors. The institutional shares remain closed. Up until January, this was called the Janus Small Cap Value fund which is still reflected in its ticker symbol. Before that, it was the Berger Small Cap Value fund. Under any name, it has been a strong, long-term performer: it has a top 2% finish in 2008 and has been consistently a top 10% sort of fund over the past 3, 5, and 10-year periods. It’s had the same lead manager for more than 20 years, though he’s added to his management team.
The Board of Trustees of GMO Trust has approved changing the name of GMO U.S. Quality Equity Fund to GMO Quality Fund. The name change will be effective June 1, 2009. This presumably signals a broadening of the fund’s intended investment universe.
Janus will no longer sell its funds to the public as of July 6, 2009. A bunch of the "Adviser Series" funds will be merged back into the no-load funds from which they were cloned. Individual investors can access Janus funds through a variety of outlets, including financial advisors or other third- party intermediaries. There’s the usual provision about existing shareholders still having access to the closed funds, with one unusual stipulation:
Shareholders of the Funds who hold accounts directly with Janus Capital can continue to invest directly with Janus Capital in their Fund and the same class of any of the other JIF Funds after the Reorganization. In addition, immediate family members or members of the same household of the individual investor may open new accounts and make purchases and exchanges in the JIF Funds.
T. Rowe Price Value (TRVLX) Fund is scheduled to lose its lead manager at the end of this year. Effective December 31, 2009, Mark S. Finn will replace John D. Linehan on the fund. Mr. Finn has been with Price since1990 and Price generally handles such transitions well. The fund has been vaguely mediocre during Mr. Linehan’s six year tenure: four strong years followed by two-plus years of lagging performance and reasonably high volatility.
Fusion Global Long/Short Fund is looking a bit mis-named. Effective March 6, Fusion Asset Management was terminated as the fund’s adviser. It’s not real clear why Fusion got fired, since the fund actually made money in 2008, its first full year of operation. The new adviser, American Independence, is a relatively new firm that runs three stock and six bond funds though there’s nothing in the public record to suggest competence in market-neutral investing.
The trustees for Managers International Equity Fund just terminated Wellington Management’s role as one of the fund’s sub-advisers and replaced them with Martin Currie, Inc. Currie is a hedge fund firmed headquartered in Edinburgh, Scotland, with about $14 billion in assets but no other experience in working with a mutual fund.
A bunch of funds are delaying their planned spring launches. Small cap investor Michael Fasciano’s namesake fund has delayed its launch for the fourth time. It’s now scheduled for an April 10 takeover. The First Trust Global IPO Index Fund filed an identical delaying action
In the pipeline for May: Three men and a baby
May’s update will focus on three funds each of which has a pedigree much like Hewlett-Packard: a company started by two buddies working out of their garage. The three funds that come closest to the H-P model are:
In closing
I’ve been honored by Roy’s faith in letting me write on FundAlarm’s behalf for these past three years. In part, that will be driven by his editorial judgment (roughly, his answer to the question "has Snowball completely lost his mind!??"). It’s also driven by FundAlarm’s financial viability. On the recent occasion of the Discussion Board’s 250,000th post, Roy noted that he has about enough money – on hand or expected – to maintain FundAlarm for another 14 months. If you benefit from FundAlarm’s vibrant discussions, data tables and – perhaps, yes, just perhaps – my monthly essay, you might want to take a minute to review
the options for supporting FundAlarm.See you in May!
David
| NEW Discussed this month: | ||
|---|---|---|
| IQ ALPHA Hedge Strategy Fund (no ticker yet): The hedge fund industry is in turmoil. Funds are collapsing. Returns are haywire. Tens of billions in assets have been yanked. Bernie Madoff stalks the hallways! And the good folks at IQ Alpha have found a way to let you in on the excitement. | ||
ALPS Equal Sector Weight ETF seeks to match the performance of the Merrill Lynch Equal Sector Weight Index. It will be an "ETF of ETFs" and will invest in nine Select Sector SPDRs. Expenses of 0.55%. Driehaus Active Income Fund is a rebranding of the Lotsoff Capital Management Active Income Fund (LCMAX). The fund seeks current income and capital appreciation by investing in fixed- and floating-rate securities, both investment-grade and junk. The "active" part reflects an arbitrage strategy: "the Fund will engage in a variety of short-term trading strategies to take advantage of the spreads in the market between callable and non-callable debt, between low and high quality credit instruments, between various maturities along the yield curve, and between the short-rate yield differences of different countries, as well as other pricing discrepancies." It’s a five-star fund now which managed to make a few cents in 2008, against a 15% loss for its peer group. Unfortunately, the fund is not retaining its management team. The new manager, K.C. Nelson, is a Lotsoff manager but apparently not a member of the current four-person team. Expenses not yet announced. The investment minimum remains $25,000, reduced to $2,000 for retirement accounts. FundX Tactical Total Return Fund seeks long-term capital appreciation and current income with an emphasis on risk management. The fund can invest in equity, bond and cash positions and can short the market. The whole FundX lineup are funds of funds and ETFs. They typically construct their portfolios in two steps: asset allocation and fund selection. The prospectus tends to be full of pretentious babble and the funds tend to have very high expense ratios. That said, they have cool ticker symbols (including REMIX and RELAX) and they consistently deliver the goods: of the five funds rated by Morningstar, two receive five stars (Flexible Income and Conservative) and two receive four stars (the flagship and Aggressive). The only clear dog is the one fund that focuses on individual stocks, rather than funds. Managed by the same team that manages all the rest of them. $2500 minimum, $1000 for retirement accounts and $500 for accounts with an automatic investment plan. 2.15% expense ratio. Harbor Special Opportunities Fund invests globally in equity securities, without regard to size, sector, industry or country. The fund can be, for example, entirely U.S. small caps one year and entirely short Europe the next. The key attraction is that it mimics a private account strategy used at Wellington Management and is led by Frank D. Catrickes. Mr. Catrickes has been with Wellington since 1998, and co-manages the very successful Hartford Capital Appreciation fund, as well as hedge funds and separate accounts. The expenses are not yet set, though they will have a 12b(1) fee. As with all Harbor funds, there’s a $2,500 minimum investment for regular accounts and $1,000 minimum for IRA and UTMA/UGMA accounts. Set to launch June 1. PIMCO Emerging Markets Infrastructure Bond Fund seeks "maximum total return, consistent with preservation of capital and prudent investment management." The fund will invest, directly and through derivatives, in securities issued by "infrastructure entities" (which sounds like something out of Star Trek) or directly in infrastructure projects and assets. Few details are yet available. Renaissance Large Cap Growth seeks long-term capital appreciation mostly by investing in US large cap stocks. The Fund normally holds 50-60 common stocks, but this number may fluctuate depending on market conditions. The fund is based on a set of large-cap growth accounts which returned (0.2%) over the past decade, against a loss of (4.3%) for their benchmark index. Michael E. Schroer is the portfolio manager; he is a Managing Partner and Chief Investment Officer of Renaissance, has been employed by Renaissance since 1984 and also has more than 27 years of investment management experience. E.R. of 1.16%. $2,000 minimum for regular accounts or $1,000 for "service class shares" in retirement accounts. Rochdale Fixed Income Opportunities Portfolio seeks high current income by investing in high yield bonds and in fixed and floating rate loans made to U.S. and foreign borrowers, as well as domestic and foreign corporate bonds including convertible bonds, asset backed securities and alternative fixed income securities or "hybrid instruments." They might toss in some hedges and/or preferred stocks, high dividend paying stocks, ETFs and money market funds. Royce Partners Value Fund seeks long-term growth of capital by doing, so far as I can tell, what all of the other Royce funds do: investing in undervalued micro- to mid-cap stocks. UP to 35% may be international, including emerging markets stocks. Charles M. Royce will manage the fund. 1.49% e.r., $2,000 investment minimum, reduced to $1,000 for retirement accounts. WisdomTree DEFA Hedged Fund is designed to provide exposure to the non-U.S. equity securities in the WisdomTree Dividend Index of Europe, Far East Asia and Australasia (DEFA Index), while at the same time minimizing exposure to fluctuations between the value of the U.S. dollar and the non-U.S. currencies reflected in the Index. The net effect of the currency hedge seems to be that the fund will do a bit better than unhedged peers when the U.S. dollar is rising and a bit worse when the U.S. dollar is falling. The index is "fundamental" rather than market-cap weighted and covers 16 countries. Expense ratio of 0.53%.WisdomTree Emerging Markets Hedged Fund is designed to provide exposure to the non-U.S. equity securities in the WisdomTree Emerging Markets Index, while at the same time minimizing exposure to fluctuations between the value of the U.S. dollar and the non-U.S. currencies reflected in the Index. Expense ratio of 0.63%. |
| NEW Discussed this month: | ||
|---|---|---|
| FMC Select (no ticker yet): Oh, come on now. Low profile is one thing. But how is it that one of the top twenty large core funds of the past decade doesn’t even warrant a working link to a Morningstar snapshot? This outstanding sibling to the outstanding FMC Strategic Value is, if anything, even lower-profile. | ||